Joseph Stalin, the dictatorial leader of the Soviet Union, who did not exactly have a reputation as an overly trusting individual, needed reliable information regarding German plans and intentions. He delegated this task to Fillip Golikov, the head of powerful and highly secretive GRU, the Chief Intelligence Directorate (Military Intelligence).

Golikov concluded that he required some certain indicators that would tip him off about the impending invasion. As a result, all GRU operatives in Europe were ordered to keep a watchful eye on the ... sheep farming industry. The head of GRU ordered his staff to create a file on every large sheep breeder and on every market where sheep were sold. From that point on he would receive a daily report with prices of sheepskins and mutton from all major European livestock breeding centers.

Furthermore, Soviet spies started paying a lot of attention to ... oiled rags discarded by German soldiers after cleaning of their weapons. These rags were gathered all over Europe (wherever German troops were stationed) and dispatched to Moscow via diplomatic channels. Upon arrival in Moscow the rags were transferred to the leading research centers for analysis.

Based on the "sheep memos" and the results of the chemical studies, general Golikov regularly reported to Stalin that the Germans were in no way ready to attack the Soviet Union. Golikov also insisted, and Stalin agreed, that warnings from all other intelligence sources including even British Prime Minister Winston Churchill should be ignored.

American troops, on the other hand, had a much tougher challenge: the occupation of the mountainous centre and western half of the island. Nevertheless, the American Seventh Army was able to reach the north coast of Sicily in only seven days and with hardly a shot fired. What allowed the US troops to accomplish "the fastest blitzkrieg in history", as General Patton once described this campaign?

According to some historians, the American government managed to strike a deal with the most powerful man on the island, the capo di tutti capi of the Sicilian mafia - Don Calogero Vizzini. The US Office of Strategic Services (OSS) - the wartime predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) - recruited Charles "Lucky" Luciano to act as an intermediary between the advancing US Army and "La Cosa Nostra". As a result of these negotiations, the mafia protected the roads from snipers, arranged enthusiastic welcomes for the advancing troops, encouraged mass desertions from the Italian army and provided guides through the confusing mountain terrain.

One might wonder what events lead to such an unlikely alliance between the Allied forces and the mafia chieftain? A negotiating expert would call this situation "a value-creation exercise in negotiations". This was a classical case of proverbial synergy, where two sides stood to benefit immensely from one shared goal - the liberation of Sicily from fascists. The benefits, derived from this partnership, however, were quite different but surprisingly congruent.

The "Program & Portfolio Management Case Studies" presentation at the PPM conference in Casablanca, Morocco in 2012

A presentation I did at the Project Portfolio Management conference in Casablanca, Morocco in 2012

My first book "Delivering Exceptional Project Results: A Practical Guide to Project Selection, Scoping, Estimation and Management" was released by J. Ross Publishing in September 2010!

Brief Synopsis:

This unique how-to implementation guide unifies project management, portfolio management, and requirements engineering into one proven, comprehensive best practice framework to help organizations deliver exceptional project results on a consistent basis. Delivering Exceptional Project Results transcends differences in the various “types” of project management, such as traditional or agile, and focuses on economic principles, methodologies, skills, tools, and techniques that can be applied successfully at companies in any industry.

M 247 "Sergeant York" story

In late seventies the US Department of Defense (DOD) outsourced the development of the self-propelled anti-aircraft (AA) weapon which featured twin radar-directed 40 mm rapid-fire guns to Ford Aerospace. The project was assigned the name of ”Sergeant York”, after the World War I US army hero, who undoubtedly would not have appreciated this dubious honor had he been alive in 1979. The weapon was intended to replace the M163 Vulcan Air Defense System and fight alongside the M1 Abrams and M2 Bradley fighting vehicles in the U.S. Army, and was similar in concept to successful Soviet and European systems such as the ZSU-23-4 and Gepard

In essence it was an air defense weapon mounted on the surplus M48 Patton tank chassis, provided by the Army, which were held in large quantities in their depots. The main job of the weapon was to sit on the front lines and automatically target and shoot down enemy aircraft, especially helicopters. As a result it was designed to hone in on metal parts rotating in the air (i.e. propeller blades).

The final test of the AA gun involved a demonstration involving a prototype weapon shooting down a hovering helicopter on one of the US DOD proving grounds somewhere in the desert in the southern part of the United States. The cost of the project at that time was approximately US $1 billion.

According to the legend cultivated in the aerospace and defense industries there was a portable toilet installed not far away from the testing grounds. Because of the hot climate, the toilet cabin had a small electric fan in it …

You probably managed to guess the rest – the billion dollar piece of equipment “decided” to ignore the much larger target – the helicopter – and targeted the unique signature of the “port-a-potty’s” electric fan!

Further tests revealed that the AA gun had the following deficiencies:

• The radar could not track low flying targets due to excessive ground clutter
• The radar could not distinguish a hovering helicopter from a clump of trees
• Turret traverse was too slow to track a fast crossing target
• The radar can be jammed very easily

As a result, the project that began in 1975 was finally cancelled by then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in 1985.